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INTRODUCTION 
egal challenges to local government development orders on the 
basis that they violate adopted comprehensive plans are unique 
and specialized cases. Because these orders are governed by a mix of 
statutory and judicial rules that depart significantly from common law 
practice, practitioners should be well aware prior to undertaking or 
defending such a case. This Article comprehensively introduces 
practitioners to those rules.  
I 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS, THE CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT AND 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. Comprehensive Plans and the Consistency Requirement 
The Community Planning Act1 (Act) mandates that all local 
governments adopt and maintain a comprehensive plan that guides 
future land development,2 and then adhere to that plan when making 
individual development decisions.3 
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161 (West 2018). 
2 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3167 (West 2018). Under the Act, cities and counties “shall 
have power and responsibility . . . [t]o adopt and amend comprehensive plans, or elements 
or portions thereof, to guide their future development and growth.” § 163.3167(1)(b). “Each 
local government shall maintain a comprehensive plan of the type and in the manner set out 
in this part . . . .” § 163.3167(2). 
3 § 163.3161(6) (“[The] intent of act that adopted comprehensive plans shall have the 
legal status set out in this act and that no public or private development shall be permitted 
except in conformity with comprehensive plans, or elements or portions thereof . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
L 
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A comprehensive plan is a statutorily mandated legislative plan to 
control and direct the development of land.4 Comprehensive plans must 
“provide the principles, guidelines, standards, and strategies for the 
orderly and balanced future economic, social, physical, environmental, 
and fiscal development . . . .”5 Comprehensive plans “shall guide future 
decisions in a consistent manner . . . .”6  
The law requires that comprehensive plans include several 
“elements,” including capital improvements,7 future land use,8 
transportation,9 general sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable 
water, natural groundwater aquifer recharge,10 conservation,11 
recreation and open space,12 housing,13 coastal management,14 and 
intergovernmental coordination.15 The required “principles and 
strategies” in each of these elements are generally labelled as “goals, 
objectives, or policies.”16 
Next, and fundamental to the issues discussed in this Article, the law 
requires that comprehensive plans “establish meaningful and 
predictable standards for the use and development of land.”17 These 
goals, objectives, and policies need not be written with as much detail 
4 § 163.3161(4) (“Through the process of comprehensive planning, it is intended that . . . 
local government can preserve, promote, protect, and improve the public health, safety, 
comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law enforcement and fire prevention, and 
general welfare; facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of transportation, water, 
sewerage, schools, parks, recreational facilities, housing, and other requirements and 
services; and conserve, develop, utilize, and protect natural resources within their 
jurisdictions.”). 
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(1) (West 2018). 
6 Id. 
7 § 163.3177(3)(a) (requiring capital improvement elements to identify the need for and 
location of public facilities to encourage their efficient use). 
8 § 163.3177(6)(a) (requiring future land use elements to designate the distribution, 
location, and extent of residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreation, 
conservation, education, public facilities, and other uses). 
9 § 163.3177(6)(b). 
10 § 163.3177(6)(c). 
11 § 163.3177(6)(d). 
12 § 163.3177(6)(e). 
13 § 163.3177(6)(f). 
14 § 163.3177(6)(g). 
15 § 163.3177(6)(h) (“coordinating the adopted comprehensive plan with the plans of 
school boards, regional water supply authorities, and other units of local government”). 
16 § 163.3177(1). 
17 Id. (requiring comprehensive plans provide “meaningful guidelines for the content of 
more detailed land developments and use regulations”). 
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and specificity as would be found in a land development regulation but 
must be specific enough to enable a court to determine whether a 
subsequently  issued development order is consistent with the 
comprehensive plan. 
B. The Consistency Requirement 
Once a local government has adopted a comprehensive plan as 
mandated by the Act, all subsequent actions taken by it with regard to 
authorizing development must be consistent with that plan.18 The 
Courts have strictly enforced this statutory mandate.19 
The development order must be consistent with the comprehensive 
plan as it exists on the date of issuance of the development order, not 
on the date of application.20 
C. The Cause of Action 
The Act provides a cause of action for persons with standing to seek 
a local circuit court order invalidating a development order on the basis 
that it is inconsistent with a governing comprehensive plan: 
Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo 
action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local 
government to challenge any decision of such local government 
granting or denying an application for, or to prevent such local 
government from taking any action on, a development order, as 
defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or 
intensity21 of use on a particular piece of property which is not 
consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part.22 
18 §§ 163.3194(1)(a), (3), 163.3201, 163.3213(1), 163.3215(3). 
19 See Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), 
review denied, 821 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2002) (holding the Act strictly prohibits the approval of 
a development order that is inconsistent with an adopted plan) (editor’s note: The author 
was counsel of record in this decision); Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 631–32 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a comprehensive plan is a statutorily mandated plan to 
control and direct the use and development of property—like a constitution governing all 
future development decisions); Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (“It is well established that a development order shall be consistent with the 
governmental body’s objectives, policies, land uses, etc., as provided in its comprehensive 
plan.”).  
20 Lake Rosa v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 911 So. 2d 206, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
21 “[A] development order that permits an increase in the number or size of structures on 
land is an alteration of the intensity of the use of the land, and a development order that 
permits an increase in population is an alteration of density. . . .” (citing Lake Rosa, 911 So. 
2d at 210). 
22 § 163.3215(3). 
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This cause of action authorizes only local citizens who are adversely 
affected to enforce local comprehensive plans. The state land planning 
agency (the Department of Economic Opportunity) that oversees the 
adoption and amendment of the plans themselves has no standing to 
enforce those plans by challenging local development orders.23 The 
Department of Legal Affairs (the Attorney General) is authorized to 
intervene in development order challenges initiated by local citizens to 
represent the interests of the state.24 
Florida Statutes section 163.3215 provides the exclusive mechanism 
for citizens to challenge development orders that are not consistent with 
the local government comprehensive plan.25 Despite this express 
statutory limitation, some courts have allowed comprehensive plan 
consistency challenges to be brought via other actions. In Das v. 
Osceola County, the court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the 
issuance of a development order and enforcement of comprehensive 
plans.26 In Bay Point Club, Inc. v. Bay County, the court affirmed a 
decision of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission in a 
Florida Statutes section 380.06 Developments of Regional Impact 
development order appeal based on inconsistency with the local 
comprehensive plan.27 Other courts, despite the clear statutory 
language, have recognized certiorari as an appropriate remedy for 
challenging consistency of a development order with the 
comprehensive plan.28 In Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, the 
Court held that, although section 163.3215 is ordinarily the sole method 
of challenging consistency of a development order with the 
comprehensive plan, a petition for writ of certiorari was appropriate 
where the county acknowledged that the development order was 
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and approved it anyway.29 In 
Palazzo Las Olas Group, L.L.C. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the court 
held that a count in the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief 
23 Pinecrest Lakes, Inc., 795 So. 2d at 199. 
24 § 163.3215(8). 
25 § 163.3215(1); Bd. of Tr. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Seminole County 
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 623 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 634 So. 2d 
622 (Fla. 1994). 
26 Das v. Osceola Cty., 685 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
27 Bay Point Club, Inc. v. Bay Cty., 890 So. 2d 256, 259–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
28 Saadeh v. City of Jacksonville, 969 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
29 Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 774 So. 2d 14, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
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pursuant to section 163.3125 “which precludes local governments from 
acting in a manner contrary to their Comprehensive Plan”30 should not 
be dismissed, but also held that “any direct challenge seeking to 
overturn the Commission’s decision denying site plan approval had to 
be sought via the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari . . . .”31 In a 
subsequent case, however, the Fourth District held that comprehensive 
plan consistency cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari, and can 
only be challenged under section 163.3215.32 
While section 163.3215 is the exclusive mechanism for challenging 
development orders on the basis that they are inconsistent with 
comprehensive plans, it does not apply to challenges to a development 
order on other grounds.33 For example, a party alleging that a 
development order violates the more detailed land development 
regulations that implement comprehensive plans must bring such a 
challenge by way of a petition for writ of certiorari. If a challenge is 
made, the petitioner has the burden to prove, based on the then existing 
record, that the local government either did not (1) afford procedural 
due process; (2) apply the correct law; or (3) support its decision with 
competent substantial evidence.34 
The remainder of this Article focuses exclusively on the procedural 
and substantive aspects of judicial review under the cause of action to 
challenge local government development orders on the basis that they 
violate that city or county’s comprehensive plan.  
As the courts have recognized, the Act’s “purpose cannot be 
achieved without meaningful judicial review in lawsuits brought under 
the Planning Act.”35 The various aspects of that judicial review are 
explained below.  
30 Palazzo Las Olas Grp., L.L.C. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 966 So. 2d 497, 502 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
31 Id. 
32 Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 1121, 1125–26 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
33 City of Coconut Creek v. City of Deerfield Beach, 840 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003); Cook v. City of Lynn Haven, 729 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); 
Thomas v. Suwannee Cty., 734 So. 2d 492, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Educ. Dev. Ctr., 
Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty., 721 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
34 Broward Cty. v. G.B.V. Int’l. Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001). 
35 Sw. Ranches Homeowners Assoc. v. Broward Cty., 502 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987). 
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II 
STANDING TO CHALLENGE DEVELOPMENT ORDERS 
The statute defines, in subjective terms, those who have standing, 
and the courts have provided clarifying interpretations. Standing is one 
of the more commonly contested issues in development order 
challenges. Standing challenges comprise a large number of the 
reported appellate decisions under the consistency statute. 
A. Statutory Grant of Standing 
Under the Act, an “aggrieved or adversely affected party” may 
challenge a local government development order by bringing a 
declaratory judgment action in local circuit (trial level) court.36 An 
“aggrieved or adversely affected party” is defined as follows: 
Any person or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to 
an interest protected or furthered by the local government 
comprehensive plan, including interests related to health and safety, 
police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of 
development, transportation facilities, health care facilities, 
equipment or services, and environmental or natural resources. The 
alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other 
members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the 
general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term 
includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development 
order.37  
B. Liberalized Standard 
Section 163.3215 has been interpreted to grant “significantly 
enhanced standing to challenge the consistency of development 
decisions with the Comprehensive Plan” compared with prior standing 
36 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3215(3) (West 2018). 
37 § 163.3215(2) (2018). Judicial decisions issued before the 2002 statutory amendment 
that explicitly granted standing to such parties had ruled that an owner, developer, or 
applicant did not have standing under section 163.3215. See Parker v. Leon Cty., 627 So. 
2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993); Poulos v. Martin Cty., 700 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997); Fla. Inst. of Tech., Inc. v. Martin Cty., 641 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), 
review denied, 651 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1995); Moore v. City of Punta Gorda, 627 So. 2d 1313, 
1314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Those cases are no longer good law, and such parties 
challenge certain aspects of a development order, such as restrictions or conditions, they 
believe are inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. 
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law.38 “As remedial statute, section 163.3215, [Fla. Stat.], should be 
liberally construed to ensure standing for a party with a protected 
interest under the comprehensive plan who will be adversely affected 
by the local government’s actions.”39 
The Fourth District Court of Appeals explained, in Education 
Development Center, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, that section 163.3215 
“enlarged the class of persons with standing to challenge a 
development order as inconsistent with the comprehensive plan.”40 
Thus, wrote the court, the statute is to “be liberally construed to 
advance the intended remedy.”41 In an earlier case, the same court 
observed that the Act “demonstrates a clear legislative policy in favor 
of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely 
affected by local action.”42 
C. Instructive Judicial Interpretations 
Florida courts have applied this standing provision to a number of 
factual scenarios in a series of decisions that have shaped the contours 
of standing for individuals and associations.  
1. Proximate Property Ownership
The decisional law makes clear that those who own land or live near
a proposed development project have standing under section 163.3215. 
An association of property owners whose land adjoins a proposed 
landfill, and who would thus be directly affected by its operation, had 
standing because they had a more direct stake in the matter than those 
with only general interest in environmental issues.43 Likewise, an 
38 Pinecrest Lakes, Inc., v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), review 
denied, 821 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2002).  
39 Bay Cty. v. Harrison, 13 So. 3d 115, 118–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Edgewater 
Beach Owners Ass’n v. Walton Cty., 833 So. 2d 215, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Sw. 
Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, 502 So. 2d at 935; Save the Homosassa River All., Inc. v. 
Citrus Cty., 2 So. 3d 329, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Parker v. Leon Cty., 627 So. 2d 
476, 479 (Fla. 1993); City of Ft. Myers v. Splitt, 988 So. 2d 29, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
40 Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty., 751 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999) (emphasis added). 
41 Id. 
42 Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, 502 So. 2d at 935 (emphasis added); see also 
Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 427, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007); Dunlap v. Orange Cty., 971 So. 2d 171, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Payne v. City 
of Miami, 927 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Pinecrest Lakes, Inc., 795 So. 2d 
at 202 (holding that “citizen enforcement is the primary tool for insuring consistency of 
development decisions with the Comprehensive Plan”).  
43 Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, 502 So. 2d at 934. 
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association that owned land adjacent to a proposed building that would 
block the ocean views of association members and cast unwanted shade 
over the associations’ recreational facilities had standing, because it 
had a more direct stake in the impact of the development than the 
general community.44  
In another case, Combs v. City of Naples, owners of property 
immediately adjacent to property for which a development order had 
been issued and an association formed to protect the interests of 
homeowners in an adjacent subdivision were found to have standing.45 
However, a person who did not own adjacent property and whose only 
interest as a city resident and taxpayer was deemed to not be an 
aggrieved or adversely affected party, and thus was denied standing.46  
Similarly, an advocacy group whose members owned and operated 
a marine business on the Miami River and an owner-operator of a 
tugboat company, were found to have standing to challenge a 
development order for a multi-use retail and residential condominium 
project in an area that had previously been restricted to water-related 
and water-dependent marine industrial uses.47 The increased difficulty 
of conducting marine industrial business as a result of residential 
development was an adverse effect.48  
In another example, the owner of an historic property adjacent to a 
proposed development was granted standing due to alleged negative 
impacts from increased traffic and lighting, altered enjoyment of light 
and air, visual and noise pollution, and the shadow cast over the 
historical property.49 Owners of lakefront property had standing to 
challenge a development order because they would be affected by the 
construction of a boat ramp to a greater extent than other landowners 
in the area who did not own lakefront property.50 Finally, the heirs of a 
family who dedicated land “for public park purposes only” and who 
44 Edgewater Beach Owners Ass’n v. Walton Cty., 833 So. 2d 215, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
45 Combs v. City of Naples, 834 So. 2d 194, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
46 Id. 
47 Payne, 927 So. 2d at 909. 
48 Id. 
49 Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 427, 433–34 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
50 Dunlap v. Orange Cty., 971 So. 2d 171, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
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retained a reversionary future estate in the land if the deed restriction 
was violated, had standing to challenge a development order.51 
2. Standing Not Limited to Ownership or Use of Adjacent or Nearby
Land 
The key aspect of standing that the courts have viewed as more 
liberal, compared to common law standing, is that the statute “does not 
say that a party must be harmed to a greater degree than the general 
public.”52 Nor does the law require plaintiffs to either own property 
adjacent to a proposed development or conduct activities on property 
immediately adjacent to it to have standing.53 
Instead, a plaintiff’s harm may be shared by others, as long as the 
extent of the plaintiff’s harm will exceed that of the general public. A 
prominent example is Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. 
Citrus County, where the court ruled that 
[a]n interpretation of the statute that requires harm different in degree 
from other citizens would eviscerate the statute and ignore its 
remedial purpose. It drags the statute back to the common law test. 
The statute is designed to remedy the governmental entity’s failure 
to comply with the established comprehensive plan, and, to that end, 
it creates a category of persons able to prosecute the claim. The 
statute is not designed to redress damage to particular plaintiffs. To 
engraft such a “unique harm” limitation onto the statute would make 
it impossible in most cases to establish standing and would leave 
counties free to ignore the plan because each violation of the plan in 
isolation usually does not uniquely harm the individual plaintiff. 
Rather, the statute simply requires a citizen/plaintiff to have a 
particularized interest of the kind contemplated by the statute, not a 
legally protectable right.54 
Thus, demonstrated efforts to protect, or regular use an enjoyment 
of, an area to be affected can confer standing. An environmental 
organization has standing (i.e. the harm it suffers “exceeds the harm 
caused to the public in general”)55 if it has invested resources and 
volunteer activities to protect the health and welfare of the lands that 
could be impacted by a development order, and to encourage 
51 White v. Metro. Dade Cty., 563 So. 2d 117, 126–27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
52 Save the Homosassa River All., Inc. v. Citrus Cty., 2 So. 3d 329, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008).  
53 See id. at 339. 
54 Id. at 340. 
55 Id. at 334. 
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environmentally sound development practices in and around them.56 
Courts will also find “that an organization has an interest that is greater 
than ‘the general interest in the community well being[sic]’ when the 
organization’s primary purpose includes protecting the particular 
interest that they allege will be adversely affected by the 
comprehensive plan violation.”57 A non-profit corporation that alleged 
specific adverse effects that the corporation and its members would 
suffer as a result of a development’s impact on the natural resources in 
a state forest was sufficient to establish standing under section 
163.3215.58 The group had alleged that the potential destruction of the 
species studied by its members would adversely affect them and that it 
had been involved in the original acquisition of the land for use as a 
state forest. Thus, the group’s interests were found to exceed those of 
the general public.59  
However, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they would likely suffer 
an adverse effect as a result of a development order. In one case, 
plaintiffs who lived over a mile from the subject property and who were 
separated from it by a large bay and a fifty-seven-acre buffer area were 
unable to prove that they would be affected by noise, traffic impact, 
and loss of property value, and thus lacked standing.60 In another case, 
Florida Rock Properties, Inc. v. Keyser, an owner of property within 
the local government who lived and recreated nowhere near the subject 
property could allege only an interest in maintaining the bucolic nature 
of his county and therefore, did not have standing under section 
163.3215.61 “Keyser never demonstrated any specific injury, only that 
the county would not be as bucolic as it once was. Keyser is a citizen 
with an interest in the environment and nothing more.”62 
56 Id. (requiring that an interest that “‘exceed[s] in degree the general interest in 
community good shared by all persons’ . . . simply means that a party must allege that they 
have an interest that is something more than ‘a general interest in community well being 
[sic]’”).  
57 Id. at 337. 
58 Putnam Cty. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 757 So. 2d 590, 593–94 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).  
59 Id. 
60 Pichette v. City of N. Miami Beach, 642 So. 2d 1165, 1165–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994). 
61 Florida Rock Props. v. Keyser, 709 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
62 Id. 
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III 
JURISDICTIONAL TIME LIMITS 
The Act sets a strict thirty-day time limit to bring a consistency 
challenge. “The de novo action must be filed no later than 30 days 
following rendition of a development order or other written decision, 
or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, 
whichever occurs later.”63 Thus, the thirty-day jurisdictional clock 
starts when the development order is filed with the local government 
clerk.64 
This time limit is jurisdictional.65 In Bal Harbor Village v. City of 
North Miami Beach, the complainant entered into a settlement 
agreement with the local government that had issued a development 
order.66 The settlement provided that the complainant could proceed 
with its section 163.3215 suit at a later date in the future, and that the 
local government would waive any defense based on timeliness.67 The 
court held that the time limits could not be waived and dismissed the 
complaint, because it was brought after the thirty-day clock had 
expired.68 
The thirty-day time limit applies to the local government action that 
actually approves the development order and is not triggered by 
preliminary decisions. In Beach v. Village of North Palm Beach City 
Council, the Village’s approval of a final certificate of appropriateness 
was deemed the triggering event, not the prior approval of a 
preliminary certificate of appropriateness.69 In Lee v. St. Johns County 
Board of County Commissioners, the county commission’s final 
approval of the development plan—not the Planning and Zoning 
Agency’s preliminary or recommended approval—was found to be the 
event that triggered the statutory filing deadline event.70 
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3215(3) (West 2018). 
64 5220 Biscayne Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Stebbins, 937 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
65 Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the Treasure Coast, 
Inc., 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
66 Bal Harbor Village v. City of N. Miami, 678 So. 2d 356, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
67 Id. at 360. 
68 Id. at 360–361. 
69 Beach v. Vill. N. Palm Beach City Council, 682 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
70 Lee v. St. Johns Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 776 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001). 
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Next, the filing deadline does not begin to run until the public has 
been given adequate notice of the issuance of the development order. 
In Das v. Osceola County, the court held that a letter issued to a 
landowner, with no notice to the public, stating that the removal of a 
tree was exempt from the comprehensive plan, did not constitute the 
rendition of a development order that triggered an objector’s 
jurisdictional timeframe to bring suit under section 163.3215.71 The 
court stated, “[a] county should, at the least, issue an order or permit of 
public record before the rights of the public to file a consistency 
challenge are foreclosed by the expiration of time.”72 Das holds that a 
third party’s deadline for filing a section 163.3215 complaint is not 
triggered unless and until the local government issues a proper 
development order. The court ruled that the plaintiffs had not waived 
their right to challenge a county’s determination that a proposed 
pipeline was consistent with or exempt from the comprehensive plan, 
because no development order making such a finding, with due notice 
to the public, had ever been issued. The court rejected the argument 
that “the County’s permitting of tree removal related to the pipeline 
constituted such notice of a development order.”73  
City of Tallahassee v. Kovach,74 and 5220 Biscayne Boulevard., 
L.L.C. v. Stebbins,75 followed Das in holding that the thirty-day filing 
deadline is not triggered until formal rendition and notice to the public 
of a development order. 
IV 
WHAT IS A DEVELOPMENT ORDER? 
A development order is “any order granting, denying, or granting 
with conditions an application for a development permit.”76 A 
“‘[d]evelopment permit’ includes any building permit, zoning permit, 
subdivision approval, rezoning, certification, special exception, 
71 Das v. Osceola Cty., 685 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).  
72 Id. at 994. 
73 Id. at 993. 
74 City of Tallahassee v. Kovach, 733 So. 2d 576, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
75 5220 Biscayne Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Stebbins, 937 So. 2d 1189, 1191–92 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
76 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3164(15) (West 2018). 
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variance, or any other official action of local government having the 
effect of permitting the development of land.”77 
The Act incorporates the definition of “development” in Florida 
Statutes section 380.04. Development is defined as “the carrying out of 
any building activity or mining operation, the making of any material 
change in the use or appearance of any structure or land, or the dividing 
of land into three or more parcels.”78 
The key exclusions from this definition are roads, utility lines, and 
agricultural uses.79 The definition excludes work for the maintenance 
or improvement of a road if carried out within a right-of-way.80 Robbins 
v. City of Miami Beach held that a city resolution approving a
“streetscape improvement project” that limited a segment of a road to 
two lanes instead of three was not a development order.81  
A development agreement is also not a “development order” 
challengeable under section 163.3215.82  
On the other hand, a letter from the planning department to 
neighbors, stating that a development did not violate the 
comprehensive plan and informing them of their right to challenge that 
determination under section 163.3215, was a development order.83 A 
development of regional impact development order is a development 
order challengeable under section 163.3215.84 
Holding that “section 163.3164 does not suggest that a development 
order is one which grants development rights only in the advanced 
stages of the development process or to a shovel-ready project,” Graves 
v. Pompano Beach found that a plat approval constituted a
challengeable development order.85 
77 § 163.3164(16). 
78 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.04(1) (West 2018). 
79 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.04(3)(a), (b), (e) (West 2018); see Florida Wildlife Fed. v. 
Collier Cty., 819 So. 2d 200, 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that local governments 
are not authorized to regulate agricultural practices under the Act). 
80 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.04(3)(a) (West 2018); see also 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. 
St. Johns Cty., 765 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Friends of Mantanzas, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 729 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
v. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs, 560 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Rinker Materials
Corp. v. Lake Park, 494 So. 2d 1123, 1126 (Fla. 1986). 
81 Robbins v. Miami Beach, 664 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
82 Combs v. Naples, 834 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
83 Das v. Osceola Cty., 715 So. 2d 1105, 1105–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
84 Edgewater Beach Owners Ass’n v. Walton Cty., 833 So. 2d 215, 220–21 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
85 Graves v. Pompano Beach, 74 So. 3d 595, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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Finally, it is what a development order authorizes to be built, not 
what the developer intends to build, that determines consistency with 
the comprehensive plan.86 
V 
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “CONSISTENT” 
The statute includes a clear definition of “consistent”: 
(a) A development order  . . .  shall be consistent with the compre-
hensive plan if the land uses, densities or intensities, and other 
aspects of development permitted . . . are compatible with and further 
the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or intensities in the 
comprehensive plan and if it meets all other criteria enumerated by 
the local government. 
(b) A development approved . . . shall be consistent with the 
comprehensive plan if the land uses, densities or intensities, capacity 
or size, timing, and other aspects of the development are compatible 
with and further the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or 
intensities in the comprehensive plan and if it meets all other criteria 
enumerated by the local government.87  
Consistency of a development order with the comprehensive plan is 
determined solely by reference to “the objectives, policies, land uses, 
and densities and intensities in the comprehensive plan” and not by 
reference to regulations adopted to implement the plan.88 Consistency 
with a local government’s land development regulations does not 
demonstrate consistency with the comprehensive plan.89 
86 See United States Sugar Corp. v. 1000 Friends of Fla., 134 So. 3d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding “[w]hether a development order is consistent with a 
comprehensive plan is determined by comparing what the order permits, not what the current 
holder intends to do under the order.”). 
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(3)(a)–(b) (West 2018) (emphasis added). 
88 Buck Lake All., Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 765 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) 
89 Id. See also Bay Cty. v. Harrison, 13 So. 3d 115, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Vill. 
of Key Biscayne v. Tesaurus Holdings, Inc., 761 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
Franklin Cty. v. S.G.I. Ltd., 728 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Windward 
Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, 743 So. 2d 635, 637–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Alachua 
Cty. v. Eagle’s Nest Farms, Inc., 473 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Sengra 
Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cty., 476 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hillsborough 
Cty. v. Putney, 495 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
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A. The Scope of the Consistency Requirement 
All relevant provisions of a comprehensive plan are enforceable 
under the Act. In Machado v. Musgrove, the Third District held that a 
development order must be consistent with all elements of the 
comprehensive plan—not just the land use element. 90 “The test,” wrote 
the court, “is whether the zoning authority’s determination that a 
proposed development conforms to each element and the objectives of 
the land use plan is supported by competent and substantial evidence. 
The traditional and non-deferential standard of strict judicial scrutiny 
applies.”91  
Machado addressed testimony from area residents who opposed the 
proposed zoning because they feared it “would bring burdensome 
traffic and alter the character of the area.”92 The decision cited with 
approval prior judicial examples of “nonconformity with the plan” 
including “a different and incompatible character of use”93 “or a failure 
to comply with the plan’s mandatory procedures.”94 Machado ruled 
that “[b]ecause the applicants were unable to show that their proposed 
commercial project was consistent with each element of the land use 
plan and furthered its objectives, the circuit court was eminently correct 
in voiding the rezoning.”95  
In White v. Dade County, the court enjoined a development order by 
enforcing comprehensive plan provisions that regulated how 
development should happen.96 Noting that Machado requires “that 
developments challenged as contrary to master plans must be strictly 
construed and that the burden is on the developer to show . . . that the 
development conforms strictly to the master plan, its elements, and 
objectives”;97 the court enjoined construction of a tennis complex––not 
because the use of a tennis court was prohibited by the plan, but because 
the development was not proven to comply with the plan’s guidelines 
for environmentally sensitive zones.98 The legal basis for this ruling 
was that the “[c]ounty did not . . . demonstrate that the complex 
90 Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
91 Id. (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 631. 
93 Id. at 633 (citing Alachua Cty., 473 So. 2d at 259). 
94 Id. (citing Hillsborough Cty., 495 So. 2d at 225–26). 
95 Id. at 635–36. 
96 White v. Metro. Dade Cty., 563 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
97 Id. at 128. 
98 Id. at 127–29.  
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conforms strictly to the [comprehensive plan], its elements, and 
objectives. . . . under the strict standard of review . . . .”99 
The law is the same in the Fourth District. In Southwest Ranches 
Homeowners Ass’n v. County of Broward, the court said a 
comprehensive plan is enforceable in its entirety: 
[W]e reject the . . . assertion that the land use element . . . alone 
should be considered in determining consistency. . . . The other 
elements of the plan were adopted pursuant to the statutory mandate 
of Chapter 163. . . . On the contrary, each subsequently adopted 
element was designed to fulfill the overall requirements and goals of 
the statute, as the text of these elements amply demonstrates. We find 
no conflict between the charter powers of the County and the 
statutorily mandated obligation to adopt a comprehensive plan and 
abide by all its elements.100 
The Fifth District, in Save Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., found 
enforceable under section 163.3215 comprehensive plan provisions 
related to “compatib[ility] with the character and vision of Old 
Homosassa.”101 
The First District, in Bay County v. Harrison, described the cause of 
action this way: 
[A] local government may not authorize any development that would 
be inconsistent with the applicable comprehensive plan. . . . An 
aggrieved party may challenge a DO as inconsistent with a 
comprehensive plan. . . . In a chapter 163 consistency proceeding, a 
court will find “consistency” between a DO and the extant 
comprehensive plan 
if the land uses, densities or intensities, and other aspects of 
development permitted by such order or regulation are 
compatible with and further the objectives, policies, land uses, 
and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan. . . . 
99 Id. at 128. 
100 Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n v. Cty. of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987); see also Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So. 2d 1121, 
1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (taking jurisdiction over a challenge to a site plan’s 
inconsistency with Historic Preservation Element policies requiring a review of the impact 
of development on historic resources); Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 204 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the theory that a development order that complied with 
a plan’s allowable uses and densities could not be challenged for inconsistency with a plan 
policy requirement for land use compatibility).  
101 Save Homosassa River All. v. Citrus Cty., 2 So. 3d 329, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008). 
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Under the statute, a reviewing court will evaluate consistency “by 
reference to ‘the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities and 
intensities in the comprehensive plan,’ itself.”102  
Further, in Dixon v. Jacksonville, the court explained that “we apply 
the standard of strict scrutiny . . . a process which involves a detailed 
examination of the development order for exact compliance with, or 
adherence to, the comprehensive plan.”103 As the court further 
explained, “[i]t is well established that a development order shall be 
consistent with the governmental body’s objectives, policies, land uses, 
etc., as provided in its comprehensive plan.”104 
In Franklin County v. S.G.I. Ltd., the court recognized that a 
development order concerning a site-plan was actionable based on 
allegations that it was inconsistent with plan provisions concerning 
adverse impacts on the ecological well-being of Apalachicola Bay.105 
It upheld a county’s denial of a development order—a site plan for a 
golf course, not because golf courses were not an allowable use but 
because of adopted comprehensive plan objectives to “support the 
conservation and protection of ecological communities” and “maintain 
the estuarine water quality surrounding coastal resources so that there 
shall be no loss of any approved shellfish harvesting classifications 
through the year 2000.”106 The court explained that “the county is 
empowered by statute to disapprove an application for site approval if 
it finds that a proposed development is inconsistent with any of the 
objectives in the comprehensive plan.”107 It ruled that 
[t]he circuit court’s statement that the county commission could not 
deny . . . approval based on “general objectives and policies”  in the 
comprehensive plan is in direct opposition to the language and 
requirements of the . . . Act, and is not supported by relevant law 
applying the [A]ct.108  
102 Bay Cty., v. Harrison, 13 So. 3d 115, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis 
added). There is no language limiting enforcement to any particular elements or type of 
policies in a plan. The court used the conjunctive “and” when referencing to the “objectives, 
policies” in an adopted plan, in addition to its “land uses,” “densities and intensities.” Id. at 
118–19. 
103 Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 764. 
105 Franklin Cty. v. S.G.I. Ltd., 728 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (emphasis added).   
108 Id. (citing City of Jacksonville Beach v. Marisol Land Dev., Inc., 706 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)). 
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In Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, the court upheld the 
denial of a development order based on comprehensive plan policies 
requiring “compatibility” of land uses and prohibiting “nuisances.”109 
The plan’s policies identified several specific development 
characteristics as being relevant to the compatibility determination, 
including—in addition to type of use, density, and intensity—height, 
appearance, aesthetics, odors, noise, smoke, vibration, traffic 
generation, nuisances, building location, dimensions, location, parking, 
ingress and egress routes and service areas, hours of operation, outdoor 
lighting, setbacks, buffers-fences, walls, landscaping, and open space 
requirements.110 Mann v. Board of County Commissioners, upheld a 
county’s denial of a rezoning on the basis that the rezoning was 
inconsistent with a policy governing the timing of zoning approvals 
relative to adequate public facilities and an objective in the Public 
Schools Facilities Element requiring the County to “[m]anage the 
timing of new development to coordinate with adequate school 
capacity.”111  
Contrarily, in Heine v. Lee County, the Second District ruled that 
“[t]he statute enunciates only three bases upon which a party may 
challenge a development order’s purported inconsistency with a 
comprehensive plan.”112 The court ruled that those bases were limited 
to “use or density or intensity” only.113 The court rejected the need to 
read “the Consistency Statute in pari materia with [Florida Statutes] 
section 163.3194(3)(a) [the definition of consistent].”114 It ruled that 
“other aspects of development permitted”115—beyond the use, density, 
and intensity standards—are not enforceable.116 
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court, in Coastal Development of 
North Florida, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, observed that “the 
comprehensive plan as a whole, including the future land use map and 
all of the other policies of the plan, consists of legislative policies that 
109 Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, 743 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999). 
110 Id. 
111 Mann v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 830 So. 2d 144, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
112 Heine v. Lee Cty., 221 So. 3d 1254, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1258. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
148 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 129 
must be applied to determine what uses can be made of a specific tract 
of land.”117 
The Heine decision appears to be an outlier. It is the only reported 
appellate decision in Florida that has not ruled that the entire 
comprehensive plan is enforceable under section 163.3215. It is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and the Florida Supreme 
Court’s opinion in City of Jacksonville Beach. 
VI 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The burden of proof and the standard of judicial review in cases 
under § 163.3215. reflect a judicial approach that gives real “teeth” to 
the statutory cause of action to enforce comprehensive plans through 
the development order consistency requirement.  
A. Burden of Proof 
In a challenge by de novo trial under section 163.3215, the burden 
is on the applicant or the local government (the proponent of the 
development order) to prove that it conforms strictly to the 
comprehensive plan.118 
B. Standard of Review – “Strict Scrutiny” 
A development order does not make law or policy but applies law 
and policy already made (in the comprehensive plan) to a specific 
application. Such decisions are “quasi-judicial” and far less 
discretionary than comprehensive planning decisions;119 that legal 
characterization leads to a much stricter review of development order 
decisions by courts. The Florida Supreme Court, in Brevard County v. 
Snyder, criticized the highly deferential, loose judicial scrutiny that was 
previously used by courts, and which led to inconsistent development 
decisions, and adopted “strict scrutiny” as the proper standard of 
judicial review.120  
117 Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So. 2d 204, 208–09 
(Fla. 2001). 
118 See United States Sugar Corp. v. 1000 Friends of Fla., 134 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013); Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. 
denied 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1988); White v. Metro. Dade Cty., 563 So. 2d 117, 128 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993). 
119 Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 471. 
120 Id. at 475–76. 
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The strict scrutiny standard is best described in Machado v. 
Musgrove, a prior appellate court decision adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Snyder.121 According to Machado, “strict implies rigid 
exactness or precision. A thing scrutinized has been subjected to minute 
investigation. Strict scrutiny is thus the process whereby a court makes 
a detailed examination of a statute, rule or order of a tribunal for exact 
compliance with, or adherence to, a standard or norm.122 
This judicial standard of review reflects the statutory definition of 
consistency in Florida Statutes section 163.3194. Machado wrote: 
The word “consistent” implies the idea or existence of some type or 
form of model, standard, guideline, point, mark or measure as a norm 
and a comparison of items or actions against that norm. Consistency 
is the fundamental relation between the norm and the compared item. 
If the compared item is in accordance with, or in agreement with, or 
within the parameters specified, or exemplified, by the norm, it is 
“consistent” with it but if the compared item deviates or departs in 
any direction or degree from the parameters of the norm, the 
compared item or action is not “consistent” with the norm.123  
The court further explained that “the term ‘strict scrutiny’ arises 
from the necessity of strict compliance with comprehensive plan.”124 
Therefore, strict scrutiny is “the process whereby a court makes 
a detailed examination of a[n] . . . order of a tribunal for exact 
compliance with, or adherence to, a standard or norm. It is the antithesis 
of a deferential review.”125 
Machado declared that a comprehensive plan is 
not a “vest-pocket tool” for making individual zoning changes based 
on political vagary. Instead, it is a broad statement of a legislative 
objective “to protect human, environmental, social, and economic 
resources; and to maintain, through orderly growth and development, 
the character and stability of present and future land use and 
development in this state.”126  
121 Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
122 City of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
123 Id. at 633–34. 
124 Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475. 
125 Machado, 519 So. 2d at 632 (emphasis added). 
126 Id. at 635 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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C. No Deference to Local Government Interpretation 
Under strict scrutiny, when a reviewing court must determine what 
a particular goal, objective or policy of what a comprehensive plan 
means, no deference is given to the local government’s construction or 
interpretation of its own comprehensive plan.127 
The case of Dixon v. City of Jacksonville made it clear that 
Comprehensive Plans are binding written laws that are to be interpreted 
according to what they say, not how they have been interpreted by the 
local government in the past: 
Because . . . the issue before us is one that is “easily subject to 
examination for strict compliance with the plan,” we apply the 
standard of strict scrutiny to resolve it, a process which involves a 
detailed examination of the development order for exact compliance 
with, or adherence to, the comprehensive plan. We reject . . . the 
City’s argument that deference should be given to the City’s 
interpretation of a law which it administers, thereby requiring its 
approval so long as its construction falls within the range of possible 
interpretations. We are instead presented with a question which is 
purely one of law, and we are not constrained by more deferential 
standards from substituting our judgment for that of the lower 
tribunal. . . .  
Indeed, were we to adopt the deferential standard . . . , the ultimate 
determination of a planned development would be placed within the 
discretion of whoever composes the membership of the governmental 
body’s planning department at any given time, and the goal of 
certainty and order in future land-use decision-making would be 
circumvented.128  
Similarly, in Pinecrest Lakes, the court explained: 
The statute is framed as a rule, a command to cities and counties that 
they must comply with their own Comprehensive Plans after they 
have been approved by the State. The statute does not say that local 
governments shall have some discretion as to whether a proposed 
development should be consistent with the . . . Plan. Consistency 
with a Comprehensive Plan is therefore not a discretionary matter.129 
127 See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475; Johnson v. Gulf Cty., 26 So. 3d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009); Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, 821 
So. 2d. 300 (Fla. 2002); Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000), aff’d, 831 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2000). 
128 Dixon, 774 So. 2d at 765 (emphasis added). 
129 Pinecrest Lakes, Inc., 795 So. 2d at 198. 
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The Court explained that such deference “would not only be 
inconsistent with the text and structure of the statute, but it would 
ignore the very reasons for adopting the legislation in the first place.”130 
The Court ruled that a judge must “pay deference only to the facts 
in the case and the applicable law. In light of the text of section 
163.3215 and the foregoing history, we reject the developer’s 
contention that the trial court erred in failing to defer to the County’s 
interpretation of its own Comprehensive Plan.”131 
D. Violations of Comprehensive Plans Not Allowed Based Upon 
Fundamental Fairness Considerations 
Another aspect of strict scrutiny is that a local government cannot 
disregard an inconsistency with a comprehensive plan by invoking the 
doctrine of “fundamental fairness.” If the plan is unfair or 
inappropriate, the local government must seek to formally amend it 
before it may approve such development.132 In Machado,133 the court 
rejected an interpretation that Florida Statutes section 
163.3194(4)(a),134 which requires a consideration of “fundamental 
fairness questions as may arise from a strict application of the plan,” 
constituted “a license to second-guess the legislative body where there 
is simply the to-be-expected collision of the plan with private 
interests.”135 
E. The Limits of Strict Scrutiny 
As demonstrated by the decisions discussed above, the burden of 
proof and the strict scrutiny standard of review have favored appellate 
decisions finding or upholding lower court findings of comprehensive 
130 Id. at 202. 
131 Id. 
132 See Baker, 774 So. 2d at 19. 
133 Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
134 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(4)(a). “A court, in reviewing local governmental 
action . . . under this act, may consider, among other things, the reasonableness of the 
comprehensive plan, or elements thereof, relating to the issue justiciably raised or the 
appropriateness and completeness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements 
thereof, in relation to the governmental action . . . under consideration. The court may 
consider the relationship of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof, to the 
governmental action taken . . . but private property shall not be taken without due process 
of law and the payment of just compensation.” Id. 
135 Machado, 519 So. 2d at 629, 635. 
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plan violations. Several reported cases have upheld development 
orders. One example is Bay County v. Harrison, which reversed a trial 
court’s ruling that a development order that authorized the construction 
of a large beachfront resort was inconsistent with the county’s 
comprehensive plan.136 Overturning the trial court’s ruling that the 
resort violated the plan’s density limit on “dwelling units” in a 
“seasonal or resort” area, the court found that the resort is a “hotel” and 
did not fit under the definition of “dwelling unit,” which the court 
interpreted the plan to define as “a permanent residence.”137 The court 
also considered how other comprehensive plans in the state 
differentiated between dwelling units and “transient units,” and 
reasoned that the Bay County plan as a whole reflected a conscious 
decision not to impose a density cap on transient units or lodging 
establishments.138 
In Arbor Properties, Inc. v. Lake Jackson Protection Alliance, Inc., 
the court reversed a trial court’s finding of comprehensive plan 
inconsistency based on the appellate court’s interpretation of the 
comprehensive plan.139 This section 163.3215 action was brought by 
an applicant who challenged an approved development order to contest 
conditions that required stringent storm water restrictions the applicant 
believed did not apply to the property.140  
The court stated that the 
Legislature has established that in reviewing consistency, a court may 
consider the “reasonableness of the comprehensive plan, or element 
or elements thereof, relating to the issue justiciably raised or the 
appropriateness and completeness of the comprehensive plan, or 
element or elements thereof, in relation to the governmental action or 
development regulation under consideration.”141 
The Court overturned the development order conditions, ruling that 
the trial court had failed to consider the “reasonableness of the 
comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof.”142 The appellate 
court ruled that the correct interpretation of the applicable provisions 
136 Harrison, 13 So. 3d at 120. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Arbor Props., Inc. v. Lake Jackson Prot. All., Inc., 51 So. 3d 502, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
140 Id. at 504. 
141 Id. at 505 (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(a)). 
142 Id. at 506 (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(a)). 
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of the Plan as a whole meant that stringent development limitations 
were not meant to apply to the subject property.143 
Arbor Properties’ reliance on section 163.3194(4) (a) (which 
authorizes a court to consider the reasonableness of the comprehensive 
plans it applies to development order) begs the question of the actual 
impact of that section on the judicial consistency analysis. While citing 
that statutory clause as the basis for ruling that the development order’s 
conditions were inconsistent with the plan, the court’s decision resulted 
from a simple legal interpretation of the plan. It is not at all clear 
whether the “reasonableness” clause in section 163.3194 (4)(a) means 
anything beyond the basic notion that courts must interpret 
comprehensive plans based upon a de novo legal interpretation. The 
decisions governing judicial interpretations are discussed in the 
following section.  
VII 
INTERPRETING WHAT A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN MEANS 
A. Interpreted Like a Statute 
Comprehensive plans are legislation and are interpreted according 
to the rules of statutory interpretation, as illustrated by the decisions 
identified below.144 Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the 
plan must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.145 If a 
comprehensive plan provision is ambiguous and does not have a “plain 
meaning,” courts will resort to a variety of rules of construction such 
as “the specific prevails over the general,” “the mention of one thing 
excludes things not mentioned,” and other legal principles.146 
One clear example of applying the plain meaning and not deferring 
to a local government’s interpretation of its own comprehensive plan is 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty., 69 So. 3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Rinker Materials Corp. v. North Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 
1973) (applying the same rules of construction to a zoning ordinance plan that would apply 
to other statutes). 
145 See 1000 Friends, 69 So. 3d at 11251126; see also Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 
816–17 (Fla. 1976); Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n v. Fla. Div. of 
Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997) (holding that undefined terms in a 
comprehensive plan “should usually be given its plain and ordinary meaning”). 
146 Seminole Cty. v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 691 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Thayer, 335 So. 2d at 817. 
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Johnson v. Gulf County, in which the court overturned a development 
order for its failure to require a buffer zone around wetlands.147 While 
the comprehensive plan categorically required buffers around 
“wetlands,” the county claimed that its long-standing interpretation 
was that the policy only applied to wetlands over which the state or 
federal government had permitting jurisdiction.148 Rejecting this claim, 
the court ruled that the development orders must comply with the actual 
terms of a comprehensive plan––not the local government’s 
interpretation of the plan.149 
Next, a comprehensive plan must be read together as a whole (in 
pari materia) and individual provisions harmonized.150 
B. The Legal Effect of the Future Land Use Map 
A comprehensive plan’s Future Land Use Element, specifically the 
Future Land Use Map and corresponding policies establishes a range 
of allowable uses and densities or intensities over large areas, and the 
specific use and intensities for specific parcels within that range are 
decided by a more detailed, implementing zoning map.151 Local 
governments are not required to rezone land to the most intensive use 
potentially allowed by the plan and can put or keep land in any zoning 
category that is consistent with the range of uses allowed by the plan.152 
In Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, Partnership, the court explained 
that 
it is not enough that Sunbelt’s proposal is consistent with what Lee 
County planners envision as the eventual buildout of this area. One 
must also look to the present character of the area, which is reflected 
in the existing zoning classification. This aspect of the 
comprehensive plan represents, in effect, a future ceiling above 
147 Johnson v. Gulf Cty., 26 So. 3d at 33, 43–44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
148 Id. at 40. 
149 Id. at 44. 
150 See Arbor Props., Inc. v. Lake Jackson Prot. All., Inc., 51 So. 3d 502, 505 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010); see also Katherine’s Bay, L.L.C. v. Fagan, 52 So. 3d 19, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010); Realty Assocs. Fund IX, L.P. v. Town of Cutler Bay, 208 So. 3d 735, 738 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).  
151 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(a)(1) (requiring a comprehensive plan’s Future 
Land Use Element to establish the “distribution, location, and extent of” the land uses, and 
the “population densities and building and structure intensities” allowed on each parcel of 
land); see also Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993) (explaining that a 
comprehensive plan’s Future Land Use Element establishes a long-range maximum limit on 
the intensity of land use and the implementing zoning ordinance establishes parcel-specific 
limits within that range). 
152 Brevard Cty., 627 So. 2d at 475. 
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which development should not proceed. It does not give developers 
carte blanche to approach that ceiling immediately, or on their 
private timetable, any more than a city or county is entitled to view 
its planning and zoning responsibilities as mere make-work.153 
C. The Listing of Permitted Uses 
The proposed use must be permitted in the comprehensive plan, 
“either specifically or by reasonable implication.”154 Where none of the 
uses permitted by the future land use category reasonably suggest the 
proposed use, the proposed use is not permitted, based on the traditional 
maxim of construction, expressio unius est exlusio alterius (the 
mention of one is the exclusion of the other.)155 Consistent with these 
rulings, “when a use or activity falls into a category of permissive uses, 
but more closely falls into a category that is prohibited by the Plan, the 
latter trumps the former and the activity must be prohibited.”156 
VIII 
TRIAL 
Even before section 163.3215 was amended in 2002 to explicitly 
identify the cause of action to be by a de novo trial, appellate courts 
held that the pre-2002 version of the statute, given the overall 
objectives and scheme of the Act, provided for a de novo trial, not 
circuit court review in its appellate capacity.157 
However, since 2002, local governments have been authorized to 
establish a local process for holding a quasi-judicial hearing on an 
application for a development order.158 Where such a process is 
153 Lee Cty. v. Sunbelt Equities II, Ltd. P’ship, 619 So.2d 996, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993). 
154 Saadeh v. Jacksonville, 969 So. 2d 1079, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
155 Dixon v. Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
156 Keene v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 22 So. 3d 665, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Volusia v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000)); see 
Stroemel v. Columbia, 930 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Saadeh v. Stanton Rowing 
Found., Inc., 912 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Barry v. Garcia, 573 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  
157 See Poulos v. Martin Cty., 700 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (editor’s 
note: The author was counsel of record in this decision); see also, Gregory v. Alachua, 553 
So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1989). 
158 FLA. STAT. ANN. §163.3215(4) (West 2018). 
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established, it limits legal challenges to development orders to a 
petition for writ of certiorari.159 
IX 
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 
If a pleading has been filed for an improper purpose, the court may 
impose an appropriate sanction on the person who signed the pleading, 
the represented party, or both.160 The sanction may include an order to 
pay the other party’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
incurred as a result of the filing of the pleading.161 
In Minto PBLH, L.L.C. v. 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc.,162 the Fourth 
District upheld a trial court’s denial of sanctions against one plaintiff 
(under Florida Statute sections 57.105 and 163.3215(6)) and 
overturned the trial court’s sanction against another unsuccessful 
plaintiff, which had been granted under section 57.105.163 
Given the key role that the interpretation of comprehensive plan 
language plays in development order challenges under section 
163.3215, the court’s ruling was significant. The court noted that “[a] 
court’s finding that a party’s interpretation of a legal document is 
incorrect ‘does not mean that the other party is necessarily entitled to 
section 57.105 57.105 fees.’”164 Applying that rule to the plaintiff’s 
unsuccessful claim that the approval of a college and a hotel violated 
the county’s comprehensive plan, the court ruled that “although the 
plaintiffs’ claims were tenuous with respect to the alleged 
inconsistency between the Comprehensive Plan and the college and 
hotel uses authorized in the Development Orders, there was at least an 
arguable basis for the plaintiffs’ claims.”165 
Underscoring the importance of citizen access to enforce the law, 
the court stated that 
while the plaintiffs’ contentions were not particularly strong and 
were ultimately determined to be incorrect, we affirm the trial court’s 
denial of sanctions . . . . Our decision is guided by the need to apply 
section 57.105 with restraint. To rule otherwise would risk chilling 
159 Id.  
160 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3215(6) (West 2018). 
161 Id. 
162 See Minto PBLH, L.L.C. v. 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc., 228 So. 3d. 147 (Dist. Ct. App. 
2017) 
163 Id. at 149.  
164 Id. at 149 (quoting Peyton v. Horner, 920 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
165 Id.  
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access to the courts. For example, if [the developer’s] argument were 
taken to its logical extreme, a losing party would be subject to 
sanctions under section 57.105 every time a court found that a statute 
or legal document was unambiguous and that the losing party’s 
interpretation was incorrect.166 
Finally, the decision emphasized that the limitation on the 
availability of sanctions under section 163.3215(6), applies only to 
situations where a party seeking fees can meet the burden of proving 
that a non-prevailing party brought the suit for an improper purpose.167 
X 
SETTLEMENT 
Section 163.3215(7), provides that, “[i]n any action under this 
section, no settlement shall be entered into by the local government 
unless the terms of the settlement have been the subject of a public 
hearing after notice as required by this part.”168 
XI 
REMEDY 
The statute authorizes “injunctive or other relief.”169 “[T]he statutory 
text makes the injunction the first and preferred remedy to alleviate the 
affects of in [sic] inconsistent land use.”170 
An inconsistent development order is void and the court’s broad 
powers under the Act include entry of an injunction mandating the 
subject property’s compliance with the comprehensive plan and 
restoration to its original condition, including the demolition of 
substantial buildings erected in violation of the comprehensive plan.171 
In Pinecrest Lakes, the court ruled that the integrity of the consistency 
requirement could not be avoided by the construction of the disputed 
166 Id. at 149–50. 
167 Id. at 149 n.1. “[T]he trial court properly denied sanctions . . . under § 163.3215(6), 
Florida Statutes, as Minto did not make a showing that the plaintiffs’ claims were brought 
for an improper purpose.” Id. 
168 Chung v. Sarasota Cty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing FLA. 
STAT. § 163.3215(7) (1996)). 
169 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3215(3), (4) (West 2018). 
170 Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
171 Id. at 207.  
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buildings during the pendency of the section 163.3215 case.172 The 
court affirmed a trial judge’s ruling that removal of the buildings was 
proper.173 
 The court rejected the developer’s argument that the injunction 
should have been denied because the monetary loss that it would suffer 
from demolition ($3.3 million) outweighed the diminution in property 
value that the plaintiff had suffered ($26,000).174 It also rejected the 
argument that the trial court should have awarded monetary damages 
or ordered screening, such as trees and shrubbery, instead of 
demolition.175 The court held that neither of these approaches would 
have corrected the violation of the comprehensive plan policy requiring 
“comparable density” and “compatibility dwelling unit types” for new 
development adjacent to large-lot single-family homes in the plaintiff’s 
zoning district.176 
The court ruled that it would not engage in a balancing of the 
financial inequities as suggested by the developer because it would lead 
to “substantial non-compliance with comprehensive plans.”177 The 
court ruled that to allow a developer to shroud an inconsistency with 
trees and shrubs, the more certain it is that courts will not enjoin an 
inconsistency and require its removal if already built.178  
In this case, the court found that the alleged inequity would have 
been avoided had the developer waited for the exhaustion of legal 
remedies before undertaking construction.179 Therefore, it found no 
inequity in ordering the apartments to be removed.180 The court found 
that the law does not allow a developer to escape this requirement by 
making the cost of enforcing the law excessive.181 It ruled that the 
integrity of the law requires that an injunction should always be granted 
to remove the development or structures that are found to be 
inconsistent with a comprehensive plan.182 The “statutory rule,” wrote 
172 Id. at 209. 
173 Id. at 196–97. 
174 Id. at 207.  
175 Id. at 207–08. 
176 Id. at 196 n.8. 
177 Id. at 207. 
178 Id. at 207–08. 
179 Id. at 208. 
180 Id.  
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 209. 
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the court, “is that if you build it, and in court it later proves inconsistent, 
it will have to come down.”183 
Although the court laid down a clear legal principle that an 
injunction should always be issued under Chapter 163, it also ruled that 
even the traditional “discretionary” approach of balancing the equities 
where an injunction is requested strongly supported removal of these 
apartments.184 Given the developer’s business decision to assume the 
risk with full knowledge that the final court decision could order 
removal of any non-conforming buildings, it was “difficult to perceive 
from the record any great inequity in requiring demolition.”185 
Moreover, said the court, the public interest in preventing the 
“flouting” of the comprehensive planning requirements would 
outweigh the monetary loss to a developer.186 Rejecting the developer’s 
plea that the multi-million-dollar cost of the buildings should preclude 
their removal, the court ruled that the developer’s conscious business 
decision to proceed with construction with knowledge that the legal 
challenge could result in the removal of the buildings placed the 
equities in favor of the plaintiff.187 To allow the buildings to stand, 
ruled the court, “would allow developers . . . to build in defiance of the 
limits and then escape compliance by making the cost of correction too 
high.”188 The court said that  
[w]e claim to be a society of laws, not of individual eccentricities in 
attempting to evade the rule of law. . . . If the rule of law requires 
land uses to meet specific standards, then allowing those who develop 
land to escape its requirements by spending on a project out of 
compliance would make the standards of growth management of 
little real consequence.189 
For these reasons, the court found it improper to balance the equities 
in terms of the relative financial loss to be felt by the developer and the 
affected person.190 Such balancing would lead to substantial non-
compliance, as the cost of the newly allowed construction will usually 
183 Id. 
184 See id. at 204. 
185 Id. at 208. 
186 Id. 
187 See id.  
188 Id. at 208. 
189 Id. 
190 See id. at 207–08. 
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be greater than any property value loss experienced by individual 
neighbors resulting from the inconsistency.191 The developer’s 
argument would “allow those with financial resources to buy their way 
out of compliance with comprehensive plans.”192 
The Pinecrest Lakes decision is perhaps the most powerful and 
striking example of judicial application of the strict scrutiny standard 
of review, and of remedial enforcement of the statutory prohibition on 
development that is inconsistent with adopted comprehensive plans. 
CONCLUSION 
The strict statutory and judicial approach to enforcement of the 
requirement that development orders be consistent with comprehensive 
plans is manifested in many ways and has several key implications for 
practitioners. First, the drafting of comprehensive plan goals, 
objectives, and policies must consider how developers can meet their 
burden of demonstrating consistency with those provisions and how 
affected citizens can point to them to protect their interests. Second, 
practitioners must consider how those adopted comprehensive plan 
provisions are likely to be interpreted and applied by courts under the 
“strict scrutiny” standard of review. Comprehensive plan language 
should be written in a manner that reflects the maxim “say what you 
mean and mean what you say.” Practitioners should also be aware that 
the non-deferential and broad enforcement cause of action does not 
limit judicial review to the record made during the process that resulted 
in the challenged local government decision. Neither does judicial 
review defer to prior practice or current interpretations by a local 
government of its own comprehensive plan. Judicial enforcement 
decisions will typically be made based on a new trial, new evidence, 
and the language of the comprehensive plan at issue. Practitioners must 
be aware of the rules courts will apply to the enforcement of the 
development order consistency requirement of section 163.3215 from 
the initial drafting of comprehensive plan language through the 
determination of remedial injunctive relief by a court at the completion 
of a successful legal challenge. 
191 Id. at 207. 
192 Id. 
